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For 200 years it has been public policy
that farmers in the United States should
control the land they operate as owners,
not tenants -- by deed, not lease; by
buying, not renting. For the first 100
years, an abundance of public lands for
sale at low prices or by homesteading made
it relatively easy for farmers to acquire
ownership.
Ownership provides farmers with freedom
to develop, improve, conserve or use land
as directed only by the free marketplace.
Hence these owner operators cleared the
lands of forests, brush and stone. They
broke the prairie, built homes, barns,
fences and roads. They established
schools, churches and local governments.
At the same time their freedom to use the
latest machinery on large and fertile
fields produced crops �nd livestock with
an efficiency never before known.
This record suggests that past public
policy was good policy -- that future
farmers should control the land they
operate as owners, not tenants. But full
farm ownership has become increasingly
difficult to achieve and maintain. Now
two fifths of the nation's farmland is
under lease. In the most productive areas
of the country over 60% of the land is
under lease -- much of it for some kind of
a share rent. How does share rent affect
farmers' freedom?
Some studies have shown that share
tenants use about the same farming
practices as cash tenants and owner oper
ators. Other studies show that share
tenants have lost most of the freedom and
incentive to develop, improve and conserve
the land and buildings they lease. This
situation raises these questions:
(1) What are the freedoms provided by
ownership? Why are they important?
(2) What are the alternative ways these
freedoms can be provided?

(3) What are the problems of share rent
leasing?
(4) What are the problems and possibili
ties of fixed or flexible cash rent
leasing?
(5) What research is suggested by this
review of farm ownership and tenancy
problems?
The purpose of this circular is to
answer these and related questions. Most
evidence to support answers is drawn from
many studies made during the past 30
years. Some of the more important sources
are listed at the end for readers who want
further information.
I.

FREEDOM, MOTIVATION AND FARMING

It is in the public interest that
farmers be strongly motivated to wisely
develop, improve, conserve and use the
nation's farmland. What is necessary to
motivate them to do a good job of
farming -- a job that produces needed food
for this generation but conserves the land
for future generations?
Philosophers and psychologists say
people want freedom from their basic phys
iological needs such as food, clothing and
shelter -- now and in the future. When
these needs are met they have freedom to
achieve "the good life" -- however
defined. Hence motivation comes from
within -- from basic physiological and
psychological wants and needs. Given
freedom, people with few exceptions strive
to satisfy these wants for themselves,
their families and future generations.
When a farmer owns the land he oper
ates, his warranty deed guarantees that he
and his heirs may have and hold the land
forever. In contrast most leases are made
for short terms. Ownership provides
greater freedom from loss of the land.
Therefore it provides greater freedom from
3

basic wants for food, clothing and shelter.
The owner's farm is his castle. This
security gives him the greatest freedom to
develop, improve and conserve the land.
He knows he or his heirs will receive the
benefits of his improvements. Because he
is secure, he has more freedom to innovate,
to adopt new and better ways of farming.
He has more freedom to respond to public
needs as indicated by prices and costs in
the marketplace.
Early philosophers also recognized that
freedom from basic wants was necessary if
people were to have freedom or liberty to
make social, political and economic
choices. Philosopher John Locke (16321704) held that private ownership of land
was the best guarantee of liberty or free
dom. The early English agriculturalist
Arthur Young (1741-1820) held that "the
magic of property turns sand into gold."
Adam Smith (1732-1790) believed that farm
owner operators had the greatest freedom
to improve and operate as indicated by the
"invisible hand" of the marketplace.

of owner operation in the United States?
What are the alternatives? In order to
judge future prospects, past trends need
to be reviewed.
A.

In 1969 about 58% of the nation's 2.3
billion acres of land was in private
ownership (Fig 1). While the federal
government owns 34% of the land, most of
this is located in the 11 western states
and Alaska. Public lands have been
described as the "scraps and remnants" of
the nation's efforts to dispose of all
land suited for farming. However, these
remnants contain valuable forests, miner
als and grazing lands.
INDIAN TRIBES AND INDIVIDUALS

Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) accepted
Locke's views, and he spoke for most of
his countrymen when he urged that farmers
should own the land they operate. Such
ownership was, in his view, the best
guarantee of freedom and morality. These
views are reflected in both the Declara
tion of Independence and the Constitution.
Yet it was the abundance of raw land
and the scarcity of labor that made owner
operation the only practical system for
improving and developing the nation's
land. Landlords found the cost of clear
ing and breaking the land prohibitive and
tenants almost impossible to secure and
keep. Investors quickly learned that it
was more profitable to buy land wholesale
and sell it retail. Farmers could not be
induced to rent unimproved land when they
could buy and improve their own. Because
owners received all the benefits of their
labor they willingly did what tenants or
hired men were unwilling to do.
II.

OWNER OPERATION: PAST TRENDS
AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

The freedoms needed by farmers are
provided by ownership. What is the future
4

Private Ownership of Farmland

TOTAL AREA 2.3 Bil. ACRES

*
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A80UT SO PEIICEIIT IS Ill ALASKA.

Fig. 1 -Land ownership in the 50 states, 1969
While the government owns, it does not
operate public lands. Operation is turned
over to private persons or corporations.
For example, private ranchers graze 273
million acres of federal pasture lands,
sometimes under a lease, but generally
under a permit for which they pay a fee.
Of the 2.3 billion acres of land in the
United States, about 57% is used for crop
and livestock production (Fig 2). This
includes some federal and state grazing
lands. Practically all this land is
privately owned except for the public
grazing lands.

USED FOR CROPS
AND LIVESTOCK
57%

OTHER USES
43%

URBAN AND TRANSPORTATION USES
3%
�
WILDLIFE REFUGES, PARKS,
�
AND PUBLIC INSTALLATIONS----------11
5%
h

CROPS
�15%

',,

/

12%

IDLE CROPLAND
2%

PASTURE AND
RANGELAND
40%

UNGRAZED-
FOREST LAND
23%

TOTAL AREA 2.3 BIL. ACRES
Fig. 2 -- Land use in the 50 states, 1969
B.

Public Programs for Private
Ownership

It was no accident that most of the
land suited for farming became privately
owned. Congress has repeatedly enacted
legislation designed to help farmers
acquire farm ownership (Fig 3). In 1800
Congress provided government credit for
land purchases, but because of widespread
abuse, these laws were repealed in 1820.
After 1841, squatters on the public land
were given the first opportunity to buy
the land they occupied. Before the Civil
War land was often granted to soldiers as
a bounty or bonus for their services. In
1862 the 160-acre Homestead Act was passed
which made public land free to anyone who
would agree to farm and improve it.
Because of the 160-acre limitation, the
first homestead act was unsuited to the
Great Plains and the West. Hence, in 1909
homesteading of 320 acres was allowed, and
in 1916 this was increased to 640 acres.
But even this was not enough for success
ful livestock ranching in many areas of
the West.
While federal land sales were discon
tinued after 1890, this did not inhibit
the creation of ranches because ranchers
had free use of much of the public grazing

lands of the West until 1934. Since then
they have been permitted to graze these
public lands for a modest fee.
In 1880, the first census revealed that
25% of the farms were operated by tenants.
By 1910, 37% of the farms were thus
operated, This situation led to the
creation of the present Federal Land Banks
to help tenants become owners. Yet the
banks were unable to stem the tide. By
1930, 42% of all farms and 44% of all
farmland was under lease. The depression
and droughts led to many farm mortgage
foreclosures and to the creation of the
Farm Security Administration (now called
Farmers Home Administration) mainly to
help tenants become owners.
Practically every farm price support
program has been partially justified on
the grounds that it will help family farm
ers secure and keep some control over the
land they operate.
Unfortunately any government program
which makes it easier to buy land tends
to increase land prices because demand is
increased much more than supply. Thus
while homestead acts, government credit
and price supports may help some farmers
acquire land ownership, they also tend to
inflate land prices. As a result these
programs are of little help to the next
generation of farmers.
5
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Original land entries, 1800- 1943

But the land market is not the villain;
it is often a corrective for mistaken
policies. The land market often also
serves the public interest better than
some public programs. For example, the
homestead acts did not prevent large
landed estates, did not prevent large
scale farming -- corporate or otherwise
and did not prevent "speculation" in land.
What did most to prevent large landed
estates, corporate farming, and excessive
profits was the free market in land -
many sellers as well as buyers competing
with one another. True, the land market
was not perfect. Some "speculators"
helped to give early realtors and the
marketplace a bad name. But recent
studies have shown that because of a free
land market most early realtors provided
a valuable service at a competitive cost.
While homesteads and other government
programs helped some farmers attain
ownership, they failed to maintain it for
the next generation of farmers. Primogen
iture -- inheritance laws which pass land
from father to eldest son -- were not
6

popular in America. Thomas Jefferson led
the opposition. Equal inheritance by all
the children became the rule.
Equal inheritance can be avoided if the
father makes a will. The father can also
either give or sell the land to an heir
before his death, but such arrangements
are generally deemed unfair unless all
children are treated equally. Usually the
operating heir has to buy out the other
heirs.
Sometimes this is impossible. Fre
quently the son needs to invest his inher
itance in machinery and livestock rather
than land. Thus far, no more acceptable
way of keeping the farm in the family has
been found; each generation of farmers
must buy the land at its market price or
remain tenants.
C.

Ownership vs. Tenancy: Present
Status and Future Prospects

The present ownership situation is
somewhat confusing. Is the glass half
full or half empty?

The 1969 census shows that 87% of all
U. S. farmers owned some land (Fig 4).
More specifically, 62% were full owners,
25% were part owners (part tenants), and
only 13% were full tenants.

FARMS

LAND IN FARMS

Fig. 4 -- Farms and land in farms,
by tenure of operator, 1969
However, these figures are not a good
indication of how U. S. farmland is held.
The difference is shown in Fig 4. In 1969
full owners operated only 35% of all farm
land, part owners operated 52%, and
full tenants only 13%. The picture of how
farms are held must be compared with the
picture of how farmland is held.

Both pictures change rapidly as farms
become larger. As farms increase in size,
the number of full owners decline and the
number of part owners increase. This is
shown in Fig 5. Note that full owners
operated 62% of farms with 140- 179 acres,
38% of farms with 260-499 acres, and only
29% of farms with 500-999 acres. In
contrast, part owners operated only 20%
of farms with 140- 179 acres and over 60% of
the farms with 1,000 acres or more.
Between 1945 and 1969, U. S. farms
doubled in size from 195 acres to 390
acres. This trend is expected to con
tinue. In 1968 an Iowa study by Saupe
showed that Iowa farmers, using modern
technology, could farm 600 acres without
difficulty. It also showed that eastern
South Dakota farmers with more small
grains and pasture could operate about
1, 000 acres, those in central South Dakota
about 2, 400 acres, and those in western
South Dakota over 7, 000 acres. Fu+ther
more, this could be done without increas
ing the amount of hired labor. Farm sizes
can be expected to increase in the years
ahead, usually by leasing more land.
Hence, the trend toward part ownership can
be expected to increase.
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Fig. 5 -- Tenure characteristics by size of farm, 48 states, 1969
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Fig. 6 -- Tenure characteristics by economic class of farm, 48 states, 1969
Another measure of farm size is gross
sales. Acres and sales are closely
related. It is not surprising that the
number of full owners decline and part
owners increase as gross receipts increase
(Fig 6). Note that tenants are not

greatly affected by size. Again, as farms
become larger in the years ahead, owner
ship can be expected to decline.
The amount of farmland leased (rented)
by tenants has been decreasing since the
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Fig. 7 -- Land in farms by tenure of operator, 1969
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1960

1970

1930's. The trends since 1900 for all
farmers are shown in Fig 7 . At the same
time the amount of farmland operated by
part owners has been increasing.
How much do part owners lease? In 1954
part owners and tenants leased about the
same amount of land, but by 1969 part
owners leased twice as much land as ten
ants. Together they leased 386 million
acres in 1954. This increased to 404
million acres in 1969.
The total land leased between 1930 and
1969 by both part owners and tenants is
shown in Table 1. Note that between 1954
and 1969 the amount of land leased in
creased from 33 to 38%. If this trend
continues at the same rate, over 50% of
the land will be under lease by the year
2000.
The amount of land under lease has
always been high in the most productive
areas of the country. For example, in
1959 over 60% of the land in the heart of

the Corn Belt was under lease (Fig 8).
This includes northwestern Iowa and part
of southeastern South Dakota. In two
thirds of South Dakota's counties 40 to
60% of the land was under lease. While
farm tenancy has declined since 1959,
both part ownership and the amount of
land under lease have increased.
Full owners have declined in past years
because of high land prices relative to
farm incomes. Many farmers cannot afford
to buy land because of the low return to
land compared to machinery and livestock.
Land prices are high because the demand
for it is strong and the supply suitable
for farming is practically fixed. Demand
is strong because many farmers need more
land and land is a good hedge against
inflation.
As a result land prices have reached an
all-time high despite lagging farm incomes
(Fig 9). Between 1960 and 1976 land
prices increased 259%, or an average of
16% a year. Investors find these increas-

Table 1. -- U. S. trends in farmland controlled by lease (rented), 1930-69
Year

Percentage of land rented
U. S. land in farms-acres
Total
Tenants
Part owners
Rented
Total
%
%
%
Millions
Millions

1930

990

432

13

31

44

1935

1055

47 1

13

32

45

1940

1065

469

15

29

44

1945

1 142

431

16

22

38

1950

1 16 1

386

15

18

33

1954

1 160

386

17

16

33

1959

1 123

382

20

14

34

1964

1 1 10

394

22

13

36

1969

1063

404

25

13

38

Source:

1930- 1964 data from U. S. Census of Agriculture as reported by
Moyer and others, Land Tenure in the United States, USDA, ERS
Agr. Info. Bul. 338, 1969 Table A-6. 1969 data is from 1969
Census of Agriculture, Vol. II General Report Chapter 3.
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es attractive but the higher prices make
it impossible for most farmers to buy all
the land they operate. Some farmers who
have recently bought land are finding it
difficult to meet the high interest and
principal payments. Farmers with limited
funds must use them to purchase machinery
and livestock. As a result the amount of
farmland under lease can be expected to
continue to increase.
The total value of U.S. farmland and
buildings was $207 billion in 1970. Of
this amount landlords furnished $69
billion or 34%, while farm mortgages
provided only $23 billion or 11%. Thus
landlords are a very important source of
capital for the farmer.
What is needed are leases that give
farmers more of the freedom of ownership.
This is particularly true since about 40%
of all farmland is under lease, and
if present trends continue, over 50% will
be under lease in the near future.
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III.

FREEDOM AND SHARE RENT LEASES

In the past the freedom that farmers
needed to develop, improve, conserve and
use the land was provided by ownership.
But in the future it appears that this
freedom will have to be provided by some
other means. Can it be provided by share
rent leases?
A.

Cash vs. Share-Rent Leases

Generally speaking there are two kinds
of rents: share rents and cash rents.
Included under share rents are share-cash
and livestock-share leases. Thus defined,
share rents have long been the most connnon
way of leasing farms in most of the crop
producing areas of the country (Fig 10) .
Cash-rent farms have been most frequent
in the Northeast and in parts of the South
where truck crops are important, and in
the Southwest and West where grazing is
important. Cash rents are frequently used
on part-time and residential farms.

I
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Cash-rent leases have been increasing.
Between 1959 and 1969 cash-rent tenants
increased from 14 to 19% of all leased
farms and from 2 1 to 35% of the land in
these farms. The figures for 1969 are
presented in Table 2. In 1969, 55% of all
tenants paid some kind of share rent
(cash, crop, or livestock). Another 26%
of all tenants paid "other or unspecified"
rents for their farms on 18% of the land.
Part owners made more use of cash rents.
One third of part owners cash rented 50%
of all the land they leased. But about
half of the part owners used some kind of
share rent on 34% of all land that they
leased (Table 2).
What are the "other and unspecified"
rents? One kind is a fixed produce rent.
But instead of delivering the produce, the
farmer may pay the cash value of the
produce. Either way, such a rent is
closer to a cash rent than a share rent.
When paid in cash it is one kind of flex
ible cash rent -- a cash rent that varies
with the price of a crop. Flexible cash
rents may vary not only with crop price
but county average yields of one or more

crops. If neither the landlord nor the
tenant can affect the amount of rent to be
paid after the lease is signed, then
flexible cash rents have the main advan
tages of both share rents and fixed cash
rents.
B.

Why Are Share Rents So
Frequently Used?

In England cash rents are almost uni
versal. Why, then, are share rents so
widely used in the United States? The
main reason is that most English landlords
are professional landlords who are inter
ested in security of rents at least cost.
Cash rent provides both. In contrast,
many farm landlords in this country are
retired farmers (or widows), or business
and professional people with relatively
short-range avocational or investment
interests. They prefer share rents for
several reasons:
( 1) Share rents introduce an element of
partnership into the lease. This
gives the share landlord a valid reason
for participating in the farm business.
This participation is especially impor
tant for retired farmers and other

Table 2. -- Kinds of rents paid by tenants and part,owners by farms and
by land leased, U.S. , 1969
Number
thousand
271

Part owners
Acres leased
Number
million
thousand
207
581
Percent

Percent

Percent

Percent

Cash

19

35

34

50

Share - cash

14

15

13

13

Crop share

31

22

32

19

Livestock share

10

9

3

2

Other & unspecified

26

18

18

16

100

100

100

100

Kind of rent

TOTAL
Source:
12

Tenants
Acres leased
million
197

U. S. Census of Agriculture 1969, Col. II, Chapter 3, p. 19.

landlords with farm experience. It
also may be very helpful to young and
inexperienced tenants. Cash landlords
on the other hand, have little reason
to participate. Furthermore, tenancy
laws discourage such participation.
(2) Share rents generally give landlords
considerably higher returns on their
investment than do cash rents. This
is justified because the share land
lord shares the tenant's management,
weather, and price risks. When rents
are the major source of income, as it
is for many landlords, the higher
share rents are often important. They
are also important to business and
professional people who have other
profitable ways to use their money.
(3) Share rents adjust automatically with
crop yields and prices. Fixed cash
rents do not. This automatic feature
induced many landlords to shift from
cash to share rents after World War II
when crop yields were increasing
rapidly. It also provides a strong
incentive to continue with share rents
during the present inflationary period.
(4) Usually the share of crops to be paid
as rent is uniform over very large
areas. Because the productivity of
farms varies, value of the share rent
also varies. The variation in
productivity makes it difficult to
determine a fair cash rent and hence
discourages,its use. However, uni
form shares do not eliminate questions
about the tenant's farming and his
division of the crops. While the
share is easily set, the amount of
the share may become a major problem
for both landlords and tenants. To
protect themselves from poor manage
ment and unfair division of crops,
most share landlords make short-term
leases -- usually one-year or year-to
year.
C.

Freedom, Share Rents
and Short Terms

Landlords and tenants agree that the
main reason short-term leases are used is

to make sure that tenants do a good job
and pay a fair share of the crops as rent.
As long as share rents are used, short
terms are fully justified. The share rent
introduces an element of partnership into
the lease, and as "partners" landlords are
entitled to a voice in management and
division of the crops. Thus share-rent
landlords do not have as much "freedom
from" worry about their tenants' manage
ment as do cash and some flexible cash
landlords.
From this it follows that share tenants
lack freedom to operate, conserve, and
improve the land. Their first task, if
they hope to keep the farm, is to operate
it in a manner acceptable to their land
lords -- a manner that provides "fair"
rents. Because the burden of proof of
good farming is on the tenants, they are
insecure. Hence they can scarcely be
expected to spend their time and money
developing, improving, or conserving land
or buildings.
Some share landlords are reluctant to
furnish improvements because there is
often no direct payment for them. Even
when specific cash rents are paid for
them, these rents are often insufficient
to pay taxes, insurance, interest and
repairs. When landlords receive only a
share of the crops and none of the share
rent is earmarked for buildings, fences,
and other improvements, landlords have
little incentive to maintain or improve
them. However, their tenants may argue
that the share rents are large enough to
cover both land and building costs. Often
this results in disagreements that are
difficult to resolve and cause insecurity.
Some tenants may offer to make improve
ments if their landlords will compensate
them for their unexhausted value when they
leave the farm. Landlords may be reluct
ant to do this for some related reasons:
(1) tenants may move after 1 or 2 years,
thereby requiring their landlords to
compensate them for much of the value of
the improvement, (2) landlords may not be
able to secure sufficient rent from their
new tenants to cover the costs of the
improvement, and (3) an agreement to
compensate tenants for their improvements
over 5-10 years tends to convert short-
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term leases into long-term leases. But
share landlords prefer short terms. This
is their best guarantee against poor
farming and unfair division of crops.
The improvement problem is partially
solved when the farmer is a part owner.
Like the full owner, the part owner has
full freedom to improve the land and
buildings he owns. This does not apply to
the land he leases. Nonetheless, part
ownership helps resolve this problem. In
1969 part ownership was most common in
the Great Plains and the West where farms
have been growing very rapidly. While
part ownership was less frequent in the
more productive areas of the Midwest, it
has been increasing rapidly in recent
years. Even though few farmers can afford
to buy all the land they operate, many can
buy that part of the land on which the
farmstead is located and thereby
eliminate that part of the improvement
problem. Unfortunately, the problem of
improvement and conservation on the share
rented land remains.
D.

Will Cost Sharing Improve
Share Rents?

Adam Smith had a low opinion of share
rent leases. He argued that share tenants
lacked the incentive to farm as intensely
as cash tenants and owner operators. For
example, suppose a certain practice costs
$ 12 an �ere and can be expected to give a
return of $18 an acre. Either a cash
tenant or an owner operator would make $6
or 50% on his investment. In contrast, a
share tenant who pays all the cost ($ 12)
and gets only two thirds of the returns
($ 12) will just break even. The landlord
who pays nothing gets one third or $6.
Obviously if such share tenants have free
dom to farm as they please they will not
make this investment.
How can share tenants be given the same
incentive to use this practice as owner
operators or cash tenants? Some econ
omists claim that all that is necessary
is for the landlords to share all variable
costs in the same way that the produce is
shared. Thus in the example given above,
the tenant would pay two thirds of the
cost ($8) and get two thirds of the
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returns ($12) or 50% on his investment.
Likewise, the landlord would pay one third
($4) and get one third ($6) or 50% on his
investment. If costs of application are
shared this solution is valid.
Because this theory is obviously cor
rect, why is it that share landlords and
tenants do not share all variable costs in
the same way that crops are shared?
The answer is that such cost sharing
converts the share-rent lease into a part
nership.
The lease, like a deed, conveys or
transfers possession, use, and enjoyment
of the land from one party to another.
Under a lease the tenant has full control
of the ousiness unless limited by the
lease. Under a partnership the control is
shared 50-50 unless otherwise agreed.
Partnerships have not proven to be a satis
factory substitute for farm leases. In
deed, they are a most difficult arrange
ment that can only work when the partners
are in general agreement about the details
of farming or one partner has full faith
and trust {n the other.
These requirements are seldom met.
Sharing all costs as in a partnership may
make the tenant less secure and hence
improvements less likely.
If cost sharing is undesirable, why do
landlords and tenants generally share
fertilizer costs? Before commercial
fertilizers were introduced, crop-share
rents were well established as one-third,
two-fifths or one-half share depending
upon the productivity of the land. If the
tenant had to pay all of the fertilizer
cost and give his landlord the usual share
of the results, this would be unfair. To
correct this situation either the fertili
zer costs had to be shared or the general
ly accepted share rent had to be lowered.
Sharing the fertilizer costs was the
practical solution.
Then why not share all operating or
variable costs? Both landlords and
tenants have objected for a number of
practical reasons. Bookkeeping is one of
them. For example, if landlords share
fuel costs, how can they be sure that some

of it is not used by their tenants for
personal purposes? Or consider part
owners who lease land from one or more
landlords. How can any landlord be sure
that shared seeds and fertilizers are used
on his land? And part owners will be
tempted to use more of their labor and
machinery on their own or cash rented land,
because they receive all the additional
return rather than only a share. This
helps explain why part owners pay a cash
rent for 50% of the land they lease.
Share landlords have a more effective
way to get tenants to farm like owners.
They sometimes tell tenants, "Now don't
worry about keeping this farm. You can
keep it as long as you do a good-job of
farming and pay a fair rent. " Whether
stated or not, this rule is well under
stood by most tenants. It's a fair rule-
an inescapable rule of share renting. It
means that the tenants must farm like
owner operators if they hope to keep the
farm. This may explain why some studies
show that share-rent tenants seem to farm
as efficiently as owner operators or cash
tenants. But tenants must have freedom
from such control if they are to have full
freedom to farm, to improve, and conserve.
Most tenants want these freedoms. They
know ownership provides them and share
renting does not. This is one reason why
so many farmers use their scarce capital
to buy land.
FREEDOM AND CASH RENT LEASING

IV.

i'

Can fixed or flexible cash rents pro
vide farmers with most of the freedom
provided by ownership? This question is
important because owner operation has not
been achieved and maintained on much of
the nation's best cropland. Furthermore,
share-rent leasing does not and apparently
cannot provide this freedom. Fortunately
the evidence is very strong that cash
rent tenants may have much of the freedom
of owner operators.
A.

Much Freedom Provided by
Cash Rents

Two hundred years ago Adam Smith ranked
English farmers as to their freedom to

improve their farms. At the top he placed
family sized owner operators. A close
second were cash tenants -- especially
when they had long-term leases under which
he found "the security of the tenant is
equal to that of the proprietor. " But
even when cash tenants had only an oral
agreement, Smith found they had much free
dom. He declared, "there is, I believe,
nowhere in Europe, except England, any
instance of the tenant building upon the
land of which he has no (written) lease
and trusting that the honour of his land
lord would take no advantage of so import
ant an improvement. " In Smith's view cash
tenants were about as high above share
rent tenants as share tenants were above
croppers or hired men. Pictured as a
tenure ladder, hired laborers would be
near the bottom, share tenants in the
middle, and cash tenants near the top just
below owner operators.
Farm tenure specialists have long
accepted the theory that for maximum
efficiency farmers must have full freedom
to operate, develop, and improve. They
agree that full ownership provides the
maximum freedom followed by cash-rent
leasing. When cash tenants have freedom
from ( 1) unjustified loss of lease,
(2) unfair rents, and (3) unfair compensa
tion for the value of his unexhausted
improvements, they have much the same
freedom to operate and improve that is
enjoyed by owner operators. Most farm
tenure specialists regard share-rent
leases.as inferior to cash-rent leases and
have spent much time and effort in an
attempt to improve share-rent leases.
Unfortunately, for reasons already given,
they have not succeeded.
Farm tenure workers generally admire the
English cash leasing system. For centuries
the English landlords have had much freedom
from worry about their tenants' farming
because the way they farmed did not affect
the amount of the cash rent to be paid.
This in turn gave their tenants much free
dom from landlord-tenant friction that
often leads to loss of lease. As a result,
even though the leases were often short,
tenure was often quite long and secure.
This led landlords to agree to compensate
their tenants for the unexhausted value
of their improvements.
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The evidence is strong that the English
cash leasing system would provide U. S .
tenants with more freedom than share-rent
leasing. Consider, for example, the
Scully Estates of Illinois, Kansas and
Nebraska. These Estates use the English
cash leasing system. They have leased
200, 000 acres of farmland to several hun
dred tenants for well over 100 years.
They use a cash one-year lease that must
be renewed annually. The. laws under which
they operate are almost the same as those
of England before 1 887 -- before the
adoption of present English tenancy
legislation.
In 1 955 I made a survey of Scully
leasing in Kansas. Of the 103 farmers
interviewed , 52 cash rented part or all of
their land from the Scully Estate and 43
leased land from other landlords for a
share rent. Only 8 were full owners. Of
these 1 03 farmers, 87% said that the Scully
tenants had more security of tenure than
share tenants. The average length of ten
ure of Scully tenants was 15 years compared
to 1 7 years for all U. S. owner operators
and 6 years for all U. S. tenants. The
average tenure for English tenants was
once about 15 years and has increased to
2 1 years. Some of the Scully tenants had
leased Scully land for three generations.
About 60% of these farmers said their
security was mainly due to the cash rents.
Almost all of the Scully tenants (96%)
said they had more freedom to farm than
share tenants. Two thirds of the other
farmers agreed. About 80% of the 103
farmers said this was mainly due to cash
rents.
The Scully leases contain a Scotch
Irish feature not generally found in
English leases. This feature is tenant
ownership of the improvements -- particu
larly buildings and fences. Incoming
Scully tenants buy these improvements from
outgoing tenants. When they leave they
sell them to the new incoming tenants at
their market value -- subject to approval
of the new tenants by the managers of the
Estate. As a result Scully tenants have
almost as much freedom to erect, remodel,
or remove improvements as do owner
operators.
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Tenant ownership of improvements is
also found on federal public lands and some
state lands -- including those of South
Dakota. This system removes a frequent
source of landlord-tenant friction and
probably accounts for some of the tenant ' s
security of tenure. Certainly it
provides tenants with much freedom to
improve.
The Scully Estates are particularly
interesting because they show that the
English cash leasing system can provide
tenants in this country with much of the
freedom of owner operators under present
farm tenure laws. But farmers themselves
are often opposed to cash leasing in part
because of the greater risks. Share rents
provide some 1 1 insurance 1 1 when crops fail
or prices are low.
But what is the cost of this insurance?
What does it do to freedom to farm? Re
search and education are needed here .
U. S. tenants' freedom to farm may be
weak even if cash rents are used because
most farm landlords are retired farmers,
business or professional people, or their
spouses. Because their ownership is often
short term, even their cash tenants may
feel too insecure to develop, improve, or
conserve the land and buildings. There is
always danger that the farm may be sold
and the new owner may want to farm himself
or perhaps secure a new tenant. Therefore ,
careful consideration should be given to
laws which would require that any landlord,
except an active or retired farmer, should
lease farmland only for cash rents and
provide permanent or continuous tenure for
their tenants. To be fully effective,
sale of the land would have to be subject
to the tenant's lease.
These laws might be patterned after
those of England, where the general
practice of the better landlords was
made uniform by law. The first effective
law was adopted in 1 887. Present English
laws (Agricultural Holdings Act of 1948)
give tenants freedom from loss of farm as
follows: ( 1 ) leases shall be continuous
or permanent but either party may termin
ate the lease by 1 year's notice which is
effective for the landlord only if he can

establish adequate cause for termination,
(2) upon termination the tenant is enti
tled to compensation for his improvements
and the landlord for any deterioration,
and (3) rents may be arbitrated upon
request of either party but not more
frequently than every 3 years.

,.

"Adequate cause" for lease termination
may be (a) the land is required for an
approved nonagricultural purpose, (b) there
is proof of tenant's poor farming, (c) the
tenant has failed to pay rent or correct
a breach of terms, (d) there is a breach
of terms that cannot be remedied, (e) the
tenant is bankrupt, or (f) the tenant has
died. English landlords can sell their
farms, but the sale is subj ect to the
tenant's lease. If the tenant wishes to
continue his lease it can only be termin
ated for cause in a due process hearing
before a special land court. The burden
of proof that the cause is adequate is on
the landlord.
In contrast , U , S , farm landlords may
refuse to renew their leases without show
ing adequate cause for this action. This
is fully justified when share rents are
used. Landlords could easily be deprived
of a fair rent simply because poor farming
or dishonest sharing under share rents
would be almost impossible to prove. If
English-type tenancy laws were adopted in
this country, landlords would have to
shift from share rents to fixed or fiex
ible cash rents.
V.

,,

SOME PROBLEMS FOR STUDY

Farmers need freedom if they are to
carry out their responsibilities as
stewards of the nation's farmlands. As
has been pointed out, efforts to provide
this freedom by ownership have not fully
succeeded. On the most productive lands
over 60% are leased -- mostly for a
share rent.
In such areas, many of the landlords
lack farm experience. Their numbers will
grow as the amount of leasing increases.
Problems with share rents increase as
farmers become part owners or lease from
more than one landlord. These changes
may explain why cash rents have been

increasing in recent years and can be
expected to increase in the future.
Is this trend toward cash leasing in
the public interest and in the interest
of farmers and their landlords? If so,
what research and educational efforts
are needed? Here are some suggestions
for future work:
(1) The comparative advantages and disad
vantages of cash- and share-rent
leasing should be made available to
landlords and tenants. This circular
summarizes past research on this
problem for farm leaders and Extension
workers, but much more needs to be
done to get the information to
landlords and tenants.
(2) Share rents provide the tenant with
some rent "insurance" because the rent
varies with crop yields and prices ,
Cash rents may also vary with the
county average yield and price of the
principal crop . However, the county
crop yields are not generally avail
able from the S. D. Crop and Livestock
Reporting Service until the following
spring. Could a County Rent Board,
composed of landlords and tenants,
estimate such yields shortly after
crops are harvested? If so, these
could be used for flexible cash rents
that have the main advantages of both
fixed cash and share rents.
(3) It is said that share-rent leases are
desirable because they permit the
landlord to participate in the manage
ment of the farm. This may be quite
helpful when the landlord is a compe
tent farmer and the tenant is a
beginner. But could not the beginner
secure such advice even though he was
paying a fixed or flexible cash rent?
(4) Because share-rent landlords provide
rent "insurance" not provided by fixed
cash rents, their share rents should
be higher than cash rents. But how
much higher? Are crop shares the
best and cheapest way to secure this
insurance? Flexible cash rents are
one alternative.
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(5) Should U.S. farm tenants be given
freedom from unjustified loss of
farms by rules such as those used in
England? If not, why not?
(6) Should all farm corporations be requir
ed to lease the land to the operator
using either fixed or flexible cash
rents? If they were, this would give
the operator more freedom of farming
and eliminate many management problems.
Unfortunately such a corporation can
not qualify under Federal income tax
laws for taxation like partnerships if
more than 20% of its gross receipts
are received as rent. Perhaps this
could be changed.
(7) Should farm owners be encouraged to
put their land in a private or cooper
ative land leasing bank that would
then lease the land to an heir until
he was able to buy it? In Canada, the
Province of Saskatchewan has created
a government owned and operated "Land
Bank" to help keep the farm in the
family , Since 1972 owners may sell
their farms to the bank and specify
which son is to lease it. The cash
leases are continuous to age 65 and
may only be broken for "adequate
cause , " The tenant may request
permission to buy the land after leas
ing for 5 years or more. Or he may
continue to lease it and specify that
his wife, or son, or daughter shall
have the first opportunity to take
over the lease. There are serious
problems created by government owner
ship and leasing of land. Some of the
problems might be avoided by a cooper
ative or a private land leasing bank
which operated under rules similar to
those of the Canadian Bank. This
possibility needs to be explored.
VI.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the beginning the nation's most
valuable resource was a wilderness. It
needed to be wisely developed, improved
and conserved for future generations.
Farmers eagerly accepted this responsibil
ity. They cleared the land of forests,
brush, and stone, and broke the prairies.
They built homes , barns, and fences. They
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established local governments, schools,
and churches.
Why were farmers so eager to perform
this awesome task? Because they had free
dom to develop, improve and conserve, made
possible by freedom from loss of land,
loss of improvements, and unfair land
charges or rent. They had these freedoms
because it was public policy that farmers
should control the land they operated as
owners, not as tenants -- by deed, not by
lease ; by buying, not by renting. Their
self interest ,was the "invisible hand"
that achieved the public interest.
While ownership provides freedom to
develop, improve, and conserve the land it
has proven to be difficult to attain and
maintain. Now 40% of the nation's land is
under lease. In some of the most product
ive areas of the country over 60% of the
land is under lease -- mostly for some
kind of a share rent.
Share-rent leases do not provide fre�
dom of ownership. Efforts to improve or
perfect share-rent leases by sharing all
variable costs the same way the crops are
shared only intensifies the element of
partnership which share rents introduce
into the lease. Both landlords and
tenants have rejected this solution.
Landlords prefer to use the short-term
lease to make sure the tenant does a good
job of farming and pays a fair share as
rent.
Cash-rent leases can provide most of
the freedom of ownership. Because cash
rents give landlords much freedom from
worry about their tenants' farming, they
can provide them with much freedom to
develop, improve, and conserve the land
and buildings. To do this, landlords must
give their tenants freedom from (1 ) unjus
tified loss of land, (2) unfair rents,
and (3) unfair compens�tion for the
unexhausted value of their improvements.
Some English landlords have provided
their tenants with these freedoms for
several centuries. During the past 100
years the practices of the better estates
have been made uniform by law. What
English landlords have done, U.S. land
lords can also do. This has been demon-

strated b y the Scully Estates of Illinois ,
Nebraska , and Kansas which have used the
English cash leasing system with several
hundred tenants for over 1 00 years. Their
tenants have most of the freedom of owner
operators.

,,

If farmers are to be stewards of the
nation's farmlands they must have much of
the freedoms of ownership to carry out
their responsibilities. These freedoms
can be measured by a tenure ladder. When

farmers own land , they are at the top of
this ladder , Cash rents can be very close
to ownership or much inferior , depending
upon the terms of the lease and laws
affecting it. But in terms of freedom ,
cash rents are usually as far above share
rents as share rents are above hired men.
When ownership is not possible , cash
rents should replace share rents at every
opportunity. To expand these opportuni
ties , more research and education is need
ed on cash-rent leasing.
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Appendix
U . S . farms and how they have been controlled, 1900-1969

Year*

Full
owners
%

1900

5. 7

56

8

1

35

1910

6. 4

53

9

1

37

1 920

6. 4

52

9

1

38

1930

6.3

47

10

1

42

193 5

6.8

47

10

1

42

1940

6. 1

50

10

1

39

1945

5.9

56

11

1

32

1950

5.4

58

15

x

27

1954

4.8

58

18

x

24

1959

3.7

57

22

1

20

1964

3.2

57

25

1

17

1969

2. 7

62

25

---+

13

Source :

Part
owners
%

Hired
managers+
%

Full
tenants
%

Number
o f farms
m illions

U . S . Census of Agriculture as reported in Agricultural
Statistics, 1972, p. 504.

* In 1880 tenancy was 25 . 6% ; in 1890 it was 28. 4% . Figures for
full owners, part owners and managers were not collected until
1900 .
+In 1964 there were only 17, 798 managed farms . In 1969 this
class was discontinued and the farms that would have been classed
as managed farms in past census reports were classed as full
owners, part owners or tenants depending on how the land was held.
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Appendix
Table 2. -- U. S. farmland and how it has been controlled, 1900-1969
Year*

Land in
farms
Mil . acres

Full
owners
%

Part
owners
%

1900

839

52

15

10

23

1910

879

53

15

6

26

1920

956

48

18

6

28

1930

990

38

25

6

31

1935

1055

37

25

6

32

1940

1065

36

28

6

30

1945

1142

36

33

9

22

1950

1161

36

37

9

18

1954

1158

34

41

9

16

1959

1124

31

45

10

14

1964

1110

29

48

10

13

1969

1063

35

52

---+

13

Source:

Full
tenants

U. S. Census of Agriculture as reported in Agricultural
Statistics, 1972, p. 505.

*No figures available before 1900.
+See table 1 footnote.
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Appendix
Table 3. -- Effect of size of farm on farmer's control, U. S. , 1969
All
farms
%

Full
owners
%

Part
owners

Under 50 acres

24

30

7

22

50 to 100 acres

17

21

8

12

100 to 180 acres

20

23

14

18

180 to 260 acres

11

10

13

13

260 to 500 acres

15

10

26

21

500 to 1,000 acres

8

4

17

9

1, 000 to 2, 000 acres

3

1

8

3

2,000 acres and over

2

1

6

2

100

100

100

100

2, 730

1, 706

672

353

100

62

25

13

Class size

Totals, percent
Number farms, thousands
percent
Source:

Full
tenants
%

U. S. Census of Agriculture 1969, General Report III,
Chapter 3, Farm Management, Farm Operators, p. 12.
All farms.

23

Appendix

Tab le 4. -- South Dakota trend s in control of farms and farmland ,
1900-69

P ercent of all operators who are : Percent o f land operated by :
Full
Hired
Part
Part
Hired
Full I Full
Full
owners owners managers tenants owners owner s managers tenants

1900

49

28

1

1920

36

28

1

35

1935

26

1

48

1910
1930

1940

1945

22

52

27

28

1

21

26

+

38

+

26

44

2

28

25

74*

44

18

44

53

10

so

16

44

12

62

32

39

+

29

17

63

44

1

22

19

34

38

42

45

+

31

26

17

17
16

28

3

23

2

36

1

39

3
3

37
23

61

4

18

64

3

17

61
61

2

7

18
13

11

U . S. Census of Agricul ture : 1900-59 data as repor ted by
P engra S. D. , AES , Econ. Pamphlet 56.

* Inc ludes part owners

+ Less than Yi o f 1 p ercent
- Not repor t ed

24

18

38

32

Source :

3

1

1959

1969

41

36

31

1964

25

38

25

1950
1954

1
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Appendix
Table 5. -- Farmers' control of commercial farms and land, U. S . , South
Dakota, North Dakota, and Minnesota, 1969
United
States

Number of farms (thousands)
Number of acres (millions)
Tenure of farmers ( % )
Full owners
Part owners
Full tenants
Total
Land by tenure ( % )
Full owners
Part owners
Full tenants
Total
Size by tenure (acres)
Full owners
Part owners
Full ten.ants
Source:

South
Dakota

North
Dakota

50
34
16
100

34
49
17
100

35
51
14
100

55
32
13
100

29
57
14
100

21
68
11
100

25
64
11
100

42
46
12
100

299
909
467

6 11
1 , 357
613

691
1 , 226
745

224
428
279

1734
918. 3

40
39. 6

42
40. 4

Minnesota

89
26. 4

U. S. Census of Agriculture, 1969 , (class 1-5 farms) ,
General Report III, Ch . 3, Table 1.9, p . 45.
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Table 6. -- Full tenants' control of leased land by kind of rent paid, the Dakotas, Minnesota,
and U.S. , 1969
United
States

South
Dakota

North
Dakota

27 1, 291

6, 952

5, 707

100

100

100

100

Cash

19

13

14

27

Share-cash

14

32

18

20

Crop-share

31

28

42

26

Livestock �hare

10

5

7

7

Other and unspecified

26

22

19

20

126, 605

4, 259

4, 250

100

100

100

100

Cash

35

21

13

24

Share-cash

15

31

22

25

Crop-share

23

20

39

27

9

9

10

7

18

19

16

17

All full tenants, number
Percent of all tenants

All land leases ( 1, 000 acres)
Percent of land leased

Livestock share
Other and unspecified
Source:

U . S. Census of Agriculture, 1969, General Report III, Ch. 3, p . 18, 43.

Minnesota
1 1, 523

3, 2 11

Appendix

Tab le 7. -- Par t owners ' control of leased land by kind of rent , f or the Dako tas , Minnesota ,
and U.S. , 1969
All part owner s , number
Percent leasing , total
Cash

Share-cash

Cash

Share-cash

Crop-share

Livestock share

Other and unspecified

N

2 1 , 239

34

26

25

100
13

100

26

100
19

Minnesota
28 , 607
100

40

14

33

41

31

18

14

13

14

528 , 436

27 , 0 16

26 , 042

1 2 � 24 1

50

44

28

39

Other and unspecified

Percent o f leased land

North
Dakota

19 , 9 1 0

32

All leased land , ( 1 , 000 acres)

S outh
Dako ta

581 , 271

Crop-share

Livestock share

......

United
S tates

3

100

1

100

13

22

2

2

19
16

2

100
23

1

100
18

17

35

30

15

12

12

2

1

